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HOW THE SUPREME COURT MAY VIEW THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT*
INTRODUCTION
The subject to be discussed in this article is the constitutionality of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Constitutionality is not the kind of thing, however, which may be
determined in vacuo merely by an examination of the statute and the Constitution.
Nor can it be discovered entirely through a reading of judicial decisions. As we all
know, the Constitution and the cases mean different things to different people, and
the constitutionality of a law ultimately depends upon what the Constitution means
to the people who are the ultimate arbiters-the justices of the Supreme Court. The
constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act thus will be determined by what
the justices who will pass upon the question think the Constitution means.
The task of the lawyer in advising clients as to the validity of the Fair Labor
Standards Act is to predict what the Supreme Court justices will say about it. The
lawyer customarily states his views as to what "the Court" will hold. Since in this
case it is quite unlikely that the members of the Court will all come to the same
conclusion,' he might more appropriately conjecture as to what the justices are likely
to say on both sides of the question. Then all that need be done is to guess how
many justices will subscribe to each opinion, and the question as to whether the Act
is constitutional will be resolved.
The writers suggest that the following opinions might be written by members of
the present Court. The opinion holding the Act valid has been prepared by Mr.
Stern. The opinion holding the Act invalid has been prepared by Mr. Smethurst.
Neither opinion is labeled here as "majority" or "minority." The fact that the opinion
holding the Act constitutional comes first is not of significance in that respect.
* This article is composed of two parts, one written by Robert L. Stern and the other by R. S.
Smethurst. The "Introduction" and "Statement of the Case" were prepared jointly by the two authors.
Biographical data may be found in footnotes appended to the writers' names, infra at pp. 433 and 444.
1 Apart from Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935), there have been
from two to four dissenting votes in almost every important recent decision under the commerce and
due process clauses. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330 (1935) (5-4); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (936) (5-4); Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587 (936)
(5-4); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937) (5-4); Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v.
Agnew, 300 U. S. 6o8 (937) (5-4); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U. S. i (1937) (5-4); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 (i937) (5-4);
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 303 U. S. 453 (1938) (5-2);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197 (1938) (6-2); Currin v.
Wallace, 59 Sup. Ct. 379 (1939) (6-2); Mulford v. Smith, 59 Sup. Ct. 648 (1939) (6-2); National
Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 59 Sup. Ct. 668 (1939) (6-2); United States v. Rock Royal Co-
operative, Inc., 59 Sup. Ct. 993 (939) (5-4).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The following statement of the case may be read as the introduction to each
opinion.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee was indicted by a grand jury in the Northern District of Pennsylvania
for violating Subsections (I), (2) and (4) of Section 15(a) of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act of 1938. A demurrer to the indictment on the ground that those provisions
of the statute were unconstitutional was sustained by the District Court. The case
comes here on direct appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act.
The indictment alleges that appellee is a manufacturer of women's garments. He
employs three hundred persons in his factory. Eighty per cent of the garments
produced in January 1939 were bought by and shipped to purchasers outside the State
of Pennsylvania. In the sale of such products appellee competes with many other
factories in Pennsylvania and other states. During the month of January, x939 some
of the persons employed by appellee (both men and women) were paid eighteen
cents an hour and were required to work fifty-four hours a week without pay for
overtime. These persons were employed both in manufacturing and clerical opera-
tions, some being sewing machine operators and others stenographers. Each machine
operator worked on goods sent outside of the state. Appellee also employed in his
factory in that month children under sixteen years of age.
The statute provides that no manufacturer shall pay to any of his employees
engaged in commerce (defined as interstate commerce) or in the production of goods
for commerce less than twenty-five cents per hour, or employ any such employee
longer than forty-four hours a week without specified additional compensation for
overtime. Sections 6 and 7.2 A person who violates these provisions of the Act, or
who ships or sells for shipment in commerce goods produced by employees employed
in violation of the above provisions is subject to fine, or after a secorid conviction to
imprisonment. Sections 15 and 16. The Act also prohibits the shipment in commerce
of goods produced in any establishment wherein "oppressive child labor" has been
employed during the thirty days preceding shipment. Section 12. Oppressive child
labor is defined, inter alia, to mean the employment in factories of children under
sixteen years of age. Section 3(1). Similar penalties are imposed for violation of this
provision.
The indictment charges appellee, in separate counts, (a) with selling and shipping
to other states garments produced by (i) sewing machine operators and (2) stenog-
raphers paid eighteen cents per hour; (b) with selling and shipping to other states
garments produced by (i) sewing machine operators and (2) stenographers em-
ployed fifty-four hours per week without compensation for overtime; (c) with selling
and shipping to persons in other states garments produced while appellee was em-
ploying in his factory children under sixteen years of age; (d) with paying (i) sew-
ing machine operators and (2) stenographers engaged in the production of goods
'The minimum wages are to be increased and the maximum hours are to be decreased after the
first year.
